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INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE  
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# **INTELLIGENCE ASPECTS OF THE EXCHANGE OF DELEGATIONS WITH THE USSR AND THE EUROPEAN SATELLITES**

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*given on 28 February 1956. Participating in the preparation of this Report, and concurring therein, were the Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff; and the Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the IAC.*

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## INTELLIGENCE ASPECTS OF THE EXCHANGE OF DELEGATIONS WITH THE USSR AND THE EUROPEAN SATELLITES

### SCOPE

This report considers the intelligence aspects of the exchange of delegations between the US and the USSR and European Satellites, i.e., visits by non-diplomatic personnel arranged on a reciprocal basis.

The intelligence aspects of other US travel, by diplomatic personnel or by private persons on a non-exchange basis, are considered only insofar as US policy with respect to exchange of delegations may affect such travel and the intelligence collection resulting therefrom.

The paper considers primarily two intelligence factors, namely:

- a. Potential positive intelligence gain to the US from exchanges.
- b. Potential value to the USSR of information obtained by Soviet and Satellite delegations in the US, or from US delegations to the USSR and the Satellites.

*The report does not consider internal security or counter-intelligence factors, with the understanding that these factors will be considered by the appropriate agencies and interdepartmental committees. Hence, under b. above, the report considers the potential intelligence gain to the USSR solely in terms of overt observation, since other forms of activity depend primarily upon internal security factors. For purposes of examining the value to the USSR of information acquired through exchanges, it has been assumed that Soviet or Satellite delegations would receive only unclassified information while in the US, and that US delegations would disclose only unclassified information.*

The report does not consider the broad political and propaganda impact of exchanges on the US, USSR, and third countries. With respect to technological gain to the US, the report has not assessed the results of exchanges to date because of lack of full evaluation. Nor has it been possible, for the purposes of this report, to assess potential future technological gain to the US systematically. (The intelligence community is, of course, primarily dependent on operating components for such an assessment.)

In its assessment of US intelligence gain, the report considers, in general terms, the potential gain to the US from the standpoint of covert intelligence collection, including the possibility of defection.

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Finally, the report considers steps that might be taken by the US Government to improve the conduct of exchanges, so as to maximize US gains and minimize those of the USSR and Satellites, and the effect that improvements in the conduct of exchanges would have on the assessments of respective gain.

## DEFINITION OF TERMS

Throughout this report a distinction is drawn between "positive intelligence gain" (or "intelligence gain"), on the one hand, and "technological gain" (or "technological value"), on the other. The former terms are used to designate gain in the sense that the information or observation contributes to the US intelligence picture of the status, capabilities, and intentions of the USSR or, on the Soviet side, to the USSR's intelligence picture of the status, capabilities, and intentions of the US. The term, "technological gain," is used to designate gain in the sense that the information or observation contributes to the technological progress of the USSR itself, as distinguished from contributing to the USSR's intelligence picture of the US.

It is recognized that a given item of information may in practice contribute in both respects, and that both types of gain are in practice sought by "intelligence" organizations and methods.

## CONCLUSIONS

*Note.* This report does not consider many factors related to exchanges (e.g., broad political and propaganda impact on the US, USSR, and third countries, as well as internal security and counter-intelligence factors). As indicated in the Scope note above, the report also has not considered the possible technological gain accruing to the US. Hence, these Conclusions are not to be construed as covering the total net advantage or disadvantage to US national interest of conducting exchanges. Statements of gain and loss, advantage and disadvantage to the US and USSR, made in this report, are related solely to the intelligence factors specified in the Scope note, and are in some instances of necessity based on judgments rather than on completely evaluated intelligence.

1. In the two exchanges completed to date, US positive intelligence gain was only moderate from the agriculture exchange, but appears to have been substantial from the automation exchange, which has not yet been fully evaluated. In both cases, the USSR's gain was primarily technological. On balance, we believe the overall intelligence and technological value to the USSR of information gained during the agricultural exchange exceeded the intelligence value of the exchange to the US. In the automation case, our tentative judgment is that there was no substantial net advantage for either side. (*Paras. 9-14*)
2. As a method of intelligence collection, the exchange of delegations complements the activities of diplomatic representatives, on the one hand, and of non-exchange travellers on the other, and has a number of peculiar advantages. Potential intelligence gain is substantial for

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many types of exchange, and particularly so in the case of scientific and economic intelligence bearing on strategic capabilities. In the aggregate, a well organized and controlled program of exchanges could be developed into a most lucrative intelligence collection facility, one that can be fully expected to produce data affecting some of the most important aspects of national security. (Paras. 15-17)

3. The exchange of delegations also offers some special opportunities for furthering covert intelligence, and for defections by Soviet nationals of great intelligence importance. (Paras. 19-20)

4. Because of the many other sources and materials available to Soviet intelligence services, Soviet intelligence gain from exchanges would be generally limited, though occasionally significant. Soviet technological gain, however, is potentially substantial, in many types of exchange, particularly in exchanges in technical and industrial fields. (Paras. 21-23)

5. There are a number of ways in which the conduct of exchanges by the US Government can be improved from an intelligence standpoint. Among these are US government-controlled initiative in the selection of fields of exchange, closer coordination with and within the intelligence community on such matters as selection, briefing, and de-briefing of personnel, and the planning of exchanges to ensure reciprocity and, wherever feasible, the exchange of relevant materials. The IAC, recognizing that this problem has important intelligence aspects, suggests that the Director of Central Intelligence, as a member of the Operations Coordinating Board, consult with the OCB as

to the utility of an interdepartmental advisory mechanism which would coordinate US views, evaluate potential gain, and select appropriate projects. The IAC believes that such a mechanism might greatly improve the chances of US net intelligence advantage from exchanges. (Paras. 29-30)

6. In the absence of substantial improvement along the above lines, we believe there is a good chance that a future exchange program would be of greater value to the USSR than to the US, as to the factors considered herein. With such improvement, however, we believe that the intelligence gain to the US could be increased, and the intelligence and technological value to the USSR reduced, to the point where exchanges would produce a clear net advantage to the US in terms of the factors here considered. (Para. 30)

7. Current estimates of overall Soviet policy indicate that the USSR is likely to continue to make exchange proposals.\* If the US were to refuse exchanges totally, or to reduce them below present levels, we believe the USSR would be likely to revert to a more restrictive policy against diplomatic and private US travel, sharply reducing the very substantial intelligence value of such travel. On the other hand, if the US expressed a continued willingness to engage in exchanges but indicated by its actions that it was bargaining hard over the selection, terms, and conditions of such exchanges, we do not believe there would be any material change in Soviet policy toward other US travel. (Paras. 31-34)

\* See NIE 11-13/1-55, "Review of Soviet Foreign Policy in the Light of the Geneva Foreign Ministers' Conference" (6 December 1955), paragraphs 10 and 13.

8. In general, exchanges between the US and the European Satellites would produce less intelligence gain to the US than visits to the USSR, while their intelli-

gence and technological value to the USSR would be virtually the same as from US-Soviet exchanges. (*Paras. 18, 24*)

## DISCUSSION

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### I. EXPERIENCE TO DATE

9. Only two US delegations, agriculture and automation, have so far gone to the USSR on exchanges, and none to the Satellites. The Soviets have sent five delegations, the above two plus housing, journalists, and the polio exchange now in progress. It is planned to send a US polio delegation in February, and a housing delegation in the spring of 1956, but not to match the journalist visit explicitly inasmuch as a large number of US journalists have visited the USSR on an individual basis.

10. From the standpoint of positive intelligence gain to the US, results were only moderate from the agriculture exchange but appear to have been substantial from the automation exchange.

a. The agriculture delegation, although admittedly shown only a small segment of Soviet agriculture, was able to make useful comparisons between Soviet and US agricultural standards, and to confirm on the spot previously uncertain judgments about agricultural conditions in the USSR. In particular, valuable information was obtained on the progress and ultimate feasibility of the corn and new lands programs, which apart from their purely agricultural significance may be significantly related to the political status of Khrushchev. However, the US delegation failed to obtain any significant information of use in the formation of quantitative estimates of total Soviet production; although such information was promised repeatedly in the course of the trip, it was never supplied.

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b. The automation delegation was permitted to see some eleven plants and institutes never previously visited by Americans, and apparently was shown virtually everything in them. US knowledge on Soviet progress in this field was extremely limited prior to the visit. On the basis of preliminary evaluation, the information acquired was of substantial

c. On the US end, the visit of the Soviet agricultural delegation produced no useful intelligence of a technical nature, but did

The Soviet automation visit was not fully exploited; incomplete evaluation indicates that it produced only a few leads of significance. 25X1B 25X1B

11. The exchanges to date have almost certainly been of substantial "technological" value to the USSR.

a. Although almost all of the information obtained by the Soviet agricultural delegates was available from open sources, the delegates were not necessarily already acquainted with it. The visit provided the delegates, some of whom were high government officials and in the position to shape Soviet policy, an intensive course in American agriculture and agricultural practices. The impact of first-hand

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observation, under these circumstances, almost certainly caused the visit to lead to improvement in Soviet agricultural practices. American livestock feed handling, breeding stock, and fattening practices seemed to make an especial impression on the delegates. Another area of conspicuous interest for them was in hybrid corn practices, leading to a sequel visit by two US hybrid corn specialists; though the Soviets unquestionably gained greatly in their understanding of hybrid corn culture, US experience indicates that such culture cannot be expected to produce drastic improvement in corn yields in the latitudes of Soviet corn growing.

b. The Soviet automation delegation also obtained information that would serve to improve substantially Soviet practices as observed by the US delegation. In particular, first-hand observation of US operations may have triggered Soviet decisions to follow certain lines of development that were within their capabilities but on which they had apparently not been convinced of feasibility. Through strict itinerary control, however, the Soviet delegation was denied access to many recent techniques they had asked to see.

c. The Soviet technological gain appears to have been modest from the housing visit, with US practices regarded as largely inapplicable to Soviet conditions. Gain from the journalist visit was almost certainly negligible.

12. From an intelligence standpoint, it seems unlikely that any unclassified information obtained by the Soviets during these visits contributed materially to current Soviet estimates of US economic progress or military strength. The visits, however, unquestionably produced certain leads for future intelligence collection.

13. On balance, we believe the overall intelligence and technological value to the USSR of information gained during the agricultural exchange exceeded the intelligence value of the exchange to the US. Pending further evaluation, we are unable to assess firmly the balance of advantage for the automation exchange; our tentative judgment is that there was no substantial net advantage for either

side. The housing and polio exchanges are incomplete, and the Soviet journalist visit is not being matched explicitly.

14. Apart from the experience of the specific exchange visits to the USSR, there have been several instances of individual non-exchange travel, and of US-Soviet contacts in third countries, in fields that might be the subject of future exchanges. The intelligence gain from many of these forms of contact has been substantial, and is part of the basis for the judgments of potential intelligence gain expressed in the following section. For example:

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b. The Geneva Conference on Atomic Energy in 1955 produced much valuable intelligence on Soviet general and theoretical progress and competence.

c. Through various other conference contacts, knowledge has been gained of Soviet capabilities in various branches of geophysics such as meteorology, ionospheric physics, aurora and afterglow, all of utmost importance in relation to Soviet ability to solve problems concerning development of intercontinental guided missiles. New and valuable information on Soviet titanium output has also been received. At a recent conference, Soviet comment on a British paper revealed awareness of the toxic capabilities of "V-agents."

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It must, of course, be recognized that in some of these cases the Soviets may have obtained compensating advantages; the cases serve, however, to indicate possibilities of US intelligence gain that might be exploited through exchanges more fully.

## II. POTENTIAL INTELLIGENCE GAIN TO THE US FROM EXCHANGES

15. In general terms, the exchange of delegations is a method of intelligence collection complementing the activities of diplomatic representatives, on the one hand, and those of non-exchange travellers on the other. Apart from the simple but important numerical increase in observers, exchanges have the following advantages as compared with these methods:

*a. Access to places and installations.* The specific nature of exchange visits will almost always lead to itineraries covering areas and installations not otherwise open to US observers.\* In addition to observations in the delegation's specific sphere of interest, such

*b. Opportunities for detailed observation.* Facility visits on an exchange basis can provide more detailed observation by more highly qualified observers than is otherwise possible, leading both to specific and to general and comparative intelligence.

*c. Personal contact with Soviet citizens on a professional and specialist basis.* Such contacts may produce voluntary or inadvertent disclosure of specific information of intelligence interest. Experience has shown that such contacts are prone to produce franker discussion of problems than is otherwise obtainable, particularly by diplomatic representatives (who are usually treated with suspicion). Personal relationships can be developed far more readily, and thereafter used by other US personnel in the USSR or if the Soviet subject ever goes outside the

\* We have not examined the possibilities arising from reciprocal concessions as to areas denied for travel.

Bloc. It is recognized, however, that intelligence obtained through such personal contacts must be examined carefully against the possibilities of deception and "planting."

*d. Additional documentary materials.* The negotiation of exchanges would permit advance arrangements for the obtaining of documentary material from the USSR of a type readily available in the US but denied by the Soviets. Even if doctored, such material would be of substantial intelligence value.

*e. Surveillance.* Because of the greater publicity surrounding exchange visits, control by the Soviets is less rigorous in some respects (e. g., customs inspection, preventing or hindering individual photography, sketches, note-taking, etc.) than for individual travellers or diplomatic representatives. (For example, in the automation case the US representatives were able to photograph freely within some plants, without interference.) 25X1C

These advantages are at a maximum for specific, carefully selected fields of exchange.

16. The degree and kind of potential intelligence gain from various types of exchange are as follows:

*a. Scientific (including medical).* The exchange of scientific delegations, particularly through reciprocal attendance at scientific conferences, offers very great, and in many cases unique, intelligence opportunities. Other sources of intelligence, such as Soviet scientific and technical publications, are far more tightly controlled than comparable US materials. Only through personal contact is it possible, in many fields, to gain useful intelligence, and experience indicates the feasibility and utility of such contacts be-

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tween scientists. (See paragraph 14 above.) Though the information acquired does not ordinarily indicate military applications directly, it can, by reference to US research and development experience, produce such indications indirectly. The intelligence resulting from scientific exchanges would be of

In addition, such exchanges offer the special possibility of prolonged stays in the USSR. Such visits could provide access to Soviet citizens on an informal basis, in ways not presently possible otherwise, and if under-

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*e. Military.\** Exchanges of delegations of small numbers of military personnel, for the purpose of visiting installations or otherwise, would permit the designation of carefully trained observers, and could produce valuable military intelligence,

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17. In the aggregate, a well organized and controlled program of exchanges could be developed into a most lucrative intelligence collection facility, one that can be fully expected to produce data affecting some of the most important aspects of national security.

18. The US intelligence gain from exchanges with European Satellites alone could also be significant, but would be generally less than

\* Exchanges of military units (for example, reciprocal naval visits) are not evaluated in this report, as being primarily diplomatic in character. Nonetheless, it should be noted that they may have substantial intelligence value. The

*d. Educational.* Exchanges in this field would provide some gain in our knowledge of Soviet educational practices and standards.

\* It is possible, for example, that exchanges of local government personnel would provide valuable information on the working of the Soviet system, as well as permitting access to special areas.

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indicated above for the USSR. East Germany is already fairly well covered by other means. Moreover, the opportunities for learning of scientific and economic progress are markedly less in the Satellites, except in carefully selected fields in the more advanced countries. As to political intelligence, exchanges might throw some light on the general situation and on Soviet methods of control. Intelligence of great importance for the planning of psychological programs might be obtained through carefully arranged exchanges.

### III. POTENTIAL GAIN TO US COVERT INTELLIGENCE AND OPERATIONS

19. As compared with diplomatic and individual travel, US delegations offer some

type. Either an overt defection or a defection in place would be likely to have great intelligence value to the US, since the members of Soviet delegations are often highly trained and competent specialists (including intelligence officers) in various fields of intelligence interest. The Soviet contacts of US delegations in the USSR are also likely to be of substantial intelligence value.

### IV. POTENTIAL VALUE TO THE USSR AND THE SATELLITES FROM EXCHANGES

21. The principal value to the USSR of exchanges is in the revelation of US progress and practices applicable to the USSR and normally superior to Soviet practices. This "technological" type of gain is generally much more important to the Soviets than gain of a strictly intelligence character.

22. From an intelligence standpoint, Soviet delegations to the US enjoy some of the same special advantages as US delegations to the USSR (see paragraph 15 above). However, in view of the enormous quantity of other materials and sources available to Soviet intelligence services, we believe that, for intelligence purposes, unclassified information obtained by Soviet delegations is almost wholly confirmatory in character. A few leads may be uncovered, and the factor of first-hand observation may contribute to the greater acceptance of previously held information. Exchanges also offer the Soviets, like the US, opportunities for inducing defection and breaches of security, or otherwise influencing US citizens in the Soviet interest, opportunities which in the absence of careful controls might be a serious problem. In the aggregate, however, assuming proper controls, we do not believe that the intelligence obtained through exchange of delegations would make more than a generally limited, though occasionally significant, contribution to the total Soviet intelligence picture of the US.

23. Potential "technological" gain, by types of exchange, would be as follows:

a. *Scientific.* The great bulk of US unclassified scientific literature is already available

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to the Soviets and is known to be carefully studied. Theoretical science is generally more communicable, involving less of an engineering know-how factor, than the technical and industrial fields discussed below. However, first-hand observation and discussion between Soviet and US scientists would fill many gaps in Soviet knowledge and would also provide advance knowledge of developments not yet reported in US literature. Hence, the value to the Soviets could in particular cases be substantial.

*b. Technical and industrial.* Despite the fact that most unclassified US information in this area is also available, experience to date has indicated that the "first-hand" factor makes the visits of delegations potentially of great value to the USSR. The degree of such value would vary greatly from case to case, and would have to be weighed with care. This gain will be greatest in fields where the Soviets are relatively most backward.

*c. Professional (law, journalism, government, etc.).* Soviet technological gain would be meager in most professional fields. In some areas such as law and journalism, the Soviet system is obviously so different that US experience would have little application.\*

*d. Educational.* It is most unlikely that the Soviets would make any discoveries about US educational methods that would be novel or applicable in the Soviet system.\*

*e. Military.* In view of the intensive Soviet study of US military methods, it is most unlikely that exchanges involving access only to US unclassified information would be of substantial technological value to the USSR as regards military application.

*f. Cultural.* Such exchanges would have minimal value to the USSR, in the terms of this paper.

24. Satellite delegations would certainly be selected in the overall Bloc interest, so that the value to the USSR would be virtually the same as for a Soviet delegation.

\* In such fields as law, journalism, and education we have not considered the more general effect of exchanges on the Soviet view of freedom vs. totalitarianism.

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## V. EFFECT OF EXCHANGES BETWEEN THE USSR AND THIRD COUNTRIES

25. In particular cases, the above assessments of US and Soviet gain from exchanges may be affected by whether exchanges in the same fields are taking place between the USSR and third countries. The UK in particular has an extensive exchange program, while a number of other Free World countries are also participating in exchanges.

26. From the standpoint of Soviet technological gain, such third country exchanges may provide the Soviets with information comparable to what they would obtain on a visit to the US, so that a separate exchange with the US would produce reduced marginal gain to the USSR. The extent to which this would be true would depend on the level of technology in the third country. In many fields, such technology, at least in unclassified areas, would be roughly comparable to that of the US. In others, however, US experience and practices would be unique in value to the USSR.

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# VI. POSSIBLE IMPROVEMENTS IN THE CONDUCT OF EXCHANGES, AND THE EFFECT OF IMPROVEMENTS ON THE GAINS TO THE US AND USSR

29. We believe that there are a number of respects in which the conduct of exchanges might be improved so that the intelligence gains to the US considered herein would be maximized, and the intelligence and technological gains to the USSR minimized. Among these are:

*a. US Government initiative.* Proposals to date have been originated largely by the USSR, and in a few cases by private US initiative. A maximum of US government-controlled initiative should be obtained. The IAC, recognizing that this problem has important intelligence aspects, suggests that the Director of Central Intelligence, as a member of the Operations Coordinating Board, consult with the OCB as to the utility of an interdepartmental advisory mechanism which would coordinate US views, evaluate potential gain, and select appropriate projects. The IAC believes that such a mechanism might greatly improve the chances of US net intelligence advantage from exchanges.

*b. Consultation with and within the Intelligence Community.* Adequate administrative arrangements, which have not hitherto existed, must be created so that the views of the intelligence community will be appropriately considered in the initiation and execution of exchange proposals. In addition, complete coordination within the intelligence community itself must be achieved, so that the fullest possible intelligence advice is promptly available.

*c. Reciprocity of itinerary and facilities.* Strict reciprocity should be ensured at the outset, and maintained thereafter. Any significant variations during the course of the Soviet visit, and the determination of which side makes a particular visit first, should be on a *quid pro quo* basis.

*d. Exchange of materials.* The experience of the agricultural delegation has demonstrated the necessity of exchange of relevant materials in advance, and where feasible as

a pre-condition, of the visits. Moreover, the planning of visits should include the preparation by the appropriate agencies and/or private sources of lists of materials that could be offered by the US and that would be of benefit if obtained from the USSR.

*e. Selection, briefing, and de-briefing of members of US delegations.* The intelligence value of any exchange depends very heavily upon the inclusion in the US delegation of properly selected and briefed observers. Persons without special qualifications or training can be made moderately useful through proper briefing and de-briefing, particularly for general observational purposes. However, it is clear from experience that the observations of persons who are neither specially qualified nor briefed are sharply reduced in value. Briefing and de-briefing should in all cases involve full and timely participation by all interested intelligence agencies. Such agencies should also be consulted wherever feasible in the selection of personnel, and particular consideration should be given to the inclusion of persons who are private consultants to the Government, or military reserve officers with relevant experience. While we recognize that the selection of such persons, by tending to impart an added official flavor to exchanges, may have disadvantages outside the scope of this paper, we do not believe that the USSR would object to such action by the US, or decline to enter into an exchange, or would make overt propaganda based thereon, in view of the unquestionably hand-picked character of Soviet delegations.

*f. Clarification of the effect of participation in exchanges on security status.* A problem that has arisen most frequently in private non-exchange travel, and that may also affect the selection of exchange delegations, is uncertainty whether a visit to the USSR will adversely affect present or prospective clearance status of the individual. (This question is separate from the issue whether persons in possession of particular types of sensitive information should be permitted to visit the USSR.) We believe this is a matter calling for a determination of policy and the issuance of appropriate guidance to all interested

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agencies, so that treatment within the Government will be uniform. In the absence of such guidance, there is a continuing danger that highly, or uniquely, qualified persons will decline to participate in exchanges simply because of uncertainty.

*g. Improvement of US security measures through use of intelligence experience.* We believe that increased consultation between positive intelligence agencies and those agencies responsible for security measures such as the selection of installations to be visited by the Soviet delegations, the briefing of US hosts, etc., would produce improvement in these measures, tending to reduce the value to the USSR of exchanges.

30. In the absence of substantial improvement in the above respects, we believe there is a good chance that a future exchange program would be of greater value to the USSR than to the US, as to the factors considered herein. With such improvement, however, we believe that the intelligence gain to the US could be increased, and the value to the USSR reduced, to the point where exchanges would produce a clear net advantage to the US in terms of the factors here considered.

#### VII. EFFECT OF US EXCHANGE POLICY ON OTHER FORMS OF INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION

31. As previously noted, exchanges must be considered alongside [REDACTED]

as methods of overt intelligence collection in the USSR. Both of these have been subject to drastic restrictions in the past. Although there has been considerable relaxation in the past year in the granting of visas and in freedom of private travel, and some greater freedom of diplomatic travel, it is notable, however, that US diplomatic representatives have still been subject to harassment in varying degrees.

\* NIE 11-13/1-55, "Review of Soviet Foreign Policy in the Light of the Geneva Foreign Ministers' Conference" (6 December 1955), paragraphs 10 and 13.

32. So long as Soviet overall policy continues as presently estimated,\* we believe that the USSR will continue to make exchange proposals in areas of maximum net potential value to it, and that it regards its gains from exchange visits to other countries, particularly the US, as one of the concrete advantages of its present policy of limited relaxation of the Iron Curtain. It must be clear to the Soviets that exchange travel is at present the only feasible method by which non-diplomatic Soviet representatives can visit the US. Hence, if the US were to refuse exchanges totally, or to reduce them below present levels, we believe the USSR would be likely to revert to a more restrictive policy both against diplomatic and private US travel — partly in retaliation for the denial of gains, partly because the US policy would permit a Soviet propaganda defense that the US had been the party responsible for lowering the Iron Curtain. Such a more restrictive Soviet policy could sharply reduce the very substantial intelligence value to the US of such travel.

33. On the other hand, if the US expressed a continued willingness to engage in exchanges but indicated by its actions that it was bargaining hard over the selection, terms, and conditions of such exchanges, we do not believe there would be any material effect on Soviet policy toward other US travel. Even if the Soviets came to feel that the US was obtaining a net advantage, in concrete terms, from exchanges, we believe that the Soviets would find it difficult to use US hard bargaining as justification for retaliation in any manner that would sacrifice the propaganda benefits to the Soviets of their present policy toward travel.

34. If, finally, the US were to broaden its exchange policy to permit a considerably accelerated rate of exchanges, we do not believe this would in itself lead to any further relaxation in Soviet policy toward travel. The Soviets probably believe that they have gone far enough to create an impression of easing, and that such US action would not place them sufficiently at a propaganda disadvantage so that they would feel any pressure on this score to go further.

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